Job Market Paper

  • Optimal Job Design and Information Elicitation

    with Arijit Mukherjee and Luis Vasconcelos

  • Abstract: Managers often rely on their subordinates for local information that aids decision-making but cannot commit to a decision rule. When the firm and the workers have conflicting interests on how such information gets used, incentives for effort and information elicitation become intertwined. We explore how this incentive problem may be solved through job design---the choice between "individual assignment" where all tasks in a given job are assigned to the same worker, and "team assignment" where the tasks are split among a group. Team assignment facilitates information elicitation but suffers from "diseconomies of scope" in incentive provision. This tradeoff drives the optimal job design, and it is shaped by two key parameters---the workers' ex-ante likelihood of being informed and the noise in the performance measure that is used to reward the worker. Individual assignment is optimal when the performance measure is well-aligned, but team is optimal when the measure is noisy and the workers are highly likely to be informed about the local conditions.

Link to the paper can be found here.

Working Papers

  • Assimilation with Different Working Skill Acquisition

  • Abstract: Discrimination has different forms across places with a variety of population compositions. We construct a two-stage assimilation model to analyze the discrimination level in groups with different discount factors. I have three main results: First, there always exists an equilibrium for any discount factors and minority group size, the equilibrium will have an on-path action profile with a cutoff rule; second, as group size increases, both discrimination level and the ability cutoff will increase; third, when discount factors vary across different regimes, the effect is not monotonic.

Link to the paper can be found here.

Work In Progress

  • The Market for Goods with Multiple Attributes

  • Abstract: In many cases, products have multiple attributes, and consumers can only learn the overall quality but not the quality of each attribute. In this article, we explore the following question: assuming that the previous consumers always file a sincere report, do the future consumers learn faster or slower when the product has more attributes? I find that when the degree of variation in the seller’s (ex-ante) types is high, consumers will learn faster when the product has more attributes than fewer attributes. On the other hand, when the degree of variation in seller’s (ex-ante) types is low, the opposite is true.

Working Notes

  • Contests with Valuation Associated with Population Uncertainty

  • Abstract: This paper examines contests with population uncertainty and the value of the prize depends on the number of players. I find that when the value of the prize increases as the number of players increases, the players tend to exert more effort, and when the value of the prize decreases as the number of players increase, the players tend to exert less effort.